ShinyHunters Oracle PeopleSoft Campaign
Public threat intelligence report on ShinyHunters / UNC6240 activity exploiting Oracle PeopleSoft PeopleTools CVE-2026-35273, with public IOCs, TTPs, and SOC detection ideas for Microsoft Sentinel and QRadar.
Executive summary
ShinyHunters, tracked in this campaign as UNC6240, has been linked by Google/Mandiant to exploitation of CVE-2026-35273, a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Oracle PeopleSoft PeopleTools Environment Management / EMHub.
The campaign was observed between 27 May and 9 June 2026 and disproportionately affected higher education. ShinyHunters claimed compromise of more than 300 PeopleSoft instances across more than 100 organizations; victim counts remain actor-claimed unless independently confirmed.
The practical defender message is direct: exposed /PSEMHUB/* and /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector paths should be treated as high-risk internet-facing ERP attack surface, and hits against those paths from untrusted sources deserve urgent review.
Contents
Campaign details
- Actor: ShinyHunters / UNC6240.
- Vulnerability: CVE-2026-35273.
- Product: Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools 8.61 and 8.62.
- Component: Environment Management / EMHub / PSEMHUB.
- Impact: unauthenticated remote code execution, data theft, extortion.
- Targeting: broad exposure-based targeting, with heavy higher education concentration.
Timeline
azurenetfiles.net are installed on attacker infrastructure.Observed and linked TTPs
| Phase | Observed behavior | ATT&CK mapping | Defensive watchpoint |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial access | Exploit internet-facing PeopleSoft EMHub/PSEMHUB component via CVE-2026-35273. | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application | External POSTs to /PSEMHUB/hub or /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector. |
| Remote access | Deploy MeshCentral/MeshAgent binaries masquerading as Azure services. | T1219 Remote Access Software; T1036 Masquerading | MeshAgent binaries, agent.ashx, azurenetfiles.net. |
| Discovery | Inspect PeopleSoft, WebLogic, NFS, hosts, and process scheduler configuration. | T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery | Reads of psappsrv.cfg, config.xml, and PeopleSoft paths from unusual processes. |
| Lateral movement | SSH fan-out using hardcoded account/password combinations and sshpass. | T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH; T1110.003 Password Spraying | sshpass, repeated SSH attempts, StrictHostKeyChecking=no. |
| Credential exposure | Outbound SMB/TCP 445 coercion may capture NetNTLM material. | T1187 Forced Authentication | Any outbound SMB from PeopleSoft servers to internet destinations. |
| Collection / staging | Compress stolen data with zstd; create extortion marker files. | T1560 Archive Collected Data; T1491 Defacement | zstd, exfil.tar.zst, marker file creation. |
Public IOCs
Network
| Indicator | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|
| 142.11.200.186 142.11.200.187 142.11.200.188 142.11.200.189 142.11.200.190 | IPv4 | Sequential staging hosts reported by Google/Mandiant; Python SimpleHTTP on TCP/8888 exposed materials. |
| 108.174.202.99 176.120.22.24 | IPv4 | Additional public reporting; 176.120.22.24 reported as hosting a clearnet mirror of the ShinyHunters DLS. |
| azurenetfiles.net | Domain | MeshCentral C2 domain masquerading as Microsoft Azure NetApp Files. |
| wss://azurenetfiles.net:443/agent.ashx | URI | Hardcoded MeshAgent C2 endpoint. |
Files and hashes
| File | SHA-256 / value | Context |
|---|---|---|
| .bash_history | 2ab684d93c1553fad87041b4dea97188a97e78589deee2a7bacff905564f3a35 | Attacker command history. |
| meshagent64-azure-ops.exe | f02a924c9ff92a8780ce812511341182c6b509d45bc59f3f7b522e37225d24fc | Preconfigured Windows MeshCentral agent. |
| meshagent64-v2.exe | d83fdb9e53c5ff03c4cb0451ea1bebd79b53f29eadc1e2fa394c7af13a86ce2f | Preconfigured Windows MeshCentral agent. |
| meshagent32-azure-ops.exe | c7e9332731b06644fc73e0046a2a89eaa59b09f54250e9bd622467187351711f | Preconfigured Windows MeshCentral agent. |
| meshagent | 68257a6f9ff196179ec03624e849927f26599eb180a7c82e14ef5bc4e93bc309 | Unconfigured Linux MeshCentral agent. |
| README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOUVE-BEEN-HACKED.TXT | N/A | Defacement / extortion marker filename. |
| *_fanout.sh | N/A | Victim-specific propagation script naming pattern. |
Sentinel detection ideas
- Alert on traffic to or from campaign IPs and
azurenetfiles.net, especially from PeopleSoft servers. - Hunt web/WAF logs for
POST /PSEMHUB/hubandPOST /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnectorfrom untrusted sources. - Alert on outbound SMB/TCP 445 from PeopleSoft servers to public IP addresses.
- Use Defender tables for MeshAgent hashes, Azure-masquerading filenames,
meshctrl.js, andagent.ashx. - Hunt Linux syslog/audit for
sshpass,StrictHostKeyChecking=no,zstd,exfil.tar.zst, and the extortion marker filename. - File integrity watch: unexpected
.jspfiles underPSEMHUB.warand modified XML underenvmetadata/data/environment.
QRadar detection ideas
- Create reference sets for campaign IPs, domains, PeopleSoft assets, and approved PeopleSoft admin sources.
- Build an offense rule for external
/PSEMHUB/*or/PSIGW/HttpListeningConnectoraccess against PeopleSoft assets. - Correlate PeopleSoft web exploitation with endpoint events: MeshAgent creation, suspicious JSP write, or outbound C2.
- High severity: PeopleSoft server outbound SMB to internet or connection to
azurenetfiles.net. - High severity: EDR/syslog payloads containing
sshpass,*_fanout.sh,README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOUVE-BEEN-HACKED.TXT, orexfil.tar.zst. - Tune only after validating legitimate EMHub/PSIGW integrations and admin ranges.
Defensive actions
- Identify all PeopleSoft PeopleTools 8.61/8.62 deployments and confirm patch/mitigation status for CVE-2026-35273.
- Disable EMHub where possible. If not possible, restrict
/PSEMHUB/*and/PSIGW/HttpListeningConnectorto trusted administrative networks only. - Block outbound SMB/TCP 445 from PeopleSoft servers to internet destinations.
- Review WebLogic access logs from at least 27 May 2026 onward.
- Audit PeopleSoft web-tier filesystems for unexpected JSPs, staging folders, new XML files, MeshAgent binaries, and extortion marker files.
- Rotate PeopleSoft/WebLogic/application credentials if compromise indicators are present; preserve logs and forensic evidence before rebuild/remediation.
Source base and limitations
This report is a public-source synthesis. It intentionally avoids exploit procedure and customer-specific detail. Victim counts and scale claims should be treated cautiously where sourced from threat actor statements rather than independent confirmation.
- Dark Reading: ShinyHunters Uses Oracle Zero-Day to Rampage Higher Ed
- Google Cloud / Mandiant: ShinyHunters Targets Education Sector with Oracle PeopleSoft Exploit
- Oracle Security Alert Advisory: CVE-2026-35273
- Field Effect: ShinyHunters used zero-day to breach PeopleSoft environments
- BleepingComputer: Oracle PeopleSoft servers hacked in ShinyHunters data theft attacks
- Google Cloud / GTIG: The Cost of a Call: From Voice Phishing to Data Extortion