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ShinyHunters Oracle PeopleSoft Campaign

Public threat intelligence report on ShinyHunters / UNC6240 activity exploiting Oracle PeopleSoft PeopleTools CVE-2026-35273, with public IOCs, TTPs, and SOC detection ideas for Microsoft Sentinel and QRadar.

Published 2026-06-14 14:40 UTC
Focus threat intelligence
Actor ShinyHunters / UNC6240
Primary Sector higher education
9.8CVSS critical RCE
100+orgs notified
68%higher education
27 Mayobserved start

Executive summary

ShinyHunters, tracked in this campaign as UNC6240, has been linked by Google/Mandiant to exploitation of CVE-2026-35273, a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Oracle PeopleSoft PeopleTools Environment Management / EMHub.

The campaign was observed between 27 May and 9 June 2026 and disproportionately affected higher education. ShinyHunters claimed compromise of more than 300 PeopleSoft instances across more than 100 organizations; victim counts remain actor-claimed unless independently confirmed.

The practical defender message is direct: exposed /PSEMHUB/* and /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector paths should be treated as high-risk internet-facing ERP attack surface, and hits against those paths from untrusted sources deserve urgent review.

PeopleSoft exploitation to data extortion internetPSEMHUBRCE MeshAgentAzuremasquerade PeopleSoftconfigdiscovery SSHfan-outmarker zstdexfilDLS Detection pressure points: external POSTs, MeshCentral C2, unexpected JSP/XML writes, outbound SMB, sshpass, zstd archives. C2 masquerade: azurenetfiles.net // wss://azurenetfiles.net:443/agent.ashx
Conceptual intrusion chain based on public Google/Mandiant reporting. It is intentionally defensive and does not include exploit instructions.

Contents

Campaign details

  • Actor: ShinyHunters / UNC6240.
  • Vulnerability: CVE-2026-35273.
  • Product: Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools 8.61 and 8.62.
  • Component: Environment Management / EMHub / PSEMHUB.
  • Impact: unauthenticated remote code execution, data theft, extortion.
  • Targeting: broad exposure-based targeting, with heavy higher education concentration.
Reported exposure concentration 68% higher education Google/Mandiant notified 100+ organizations.Most were US-based.68% operated in higher education.WAFs helped some exposed orgs, but were not durable controls. ERP systems concentrate student, payroll, HR, and financial data; that makes successful access high leverage for extortion.
Publicly reported victim-notification demographics; not a verified final victim count.

Timeline

2026-05-27: Observed exploitation/staging begins. MeshCentral v1.1.59 and certificate automation for azurenetfiles.net are installed on attacker infrastructure.
2026-05-29: Attackers check for Authenticode-related npm tooling, suggesting interest in signing or inspecting Windows binaries.
2026-05-27 to 2026-06-09: Exploitation and post-exploitation activity observed against PeopleSoft environments.
2026-06-09: Public reports identify exposed attacker directories; stolen data appears on the ShinyHunters data leak site.
2026-06-10: Oracle publishes the CVE-2026-35273 security alert.
2026-06-11 onward: Google/Mandiant and public reporting confirm ShinyHunters / UNC6240 exploitation activity.

Observed and linked TTPs

PhaseObserved behaviorATT&CK mappingDefensive watchpoint
Initial accessExploit internet-facing PeopleSoft EMHub/PSEMHUB component via CVE-2026-35273.T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationExternal POSTs to /PSEMHUB/hub or /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector.
Remote accessDeploy MeshCentral/MeshAgent binaries masquerading as Azure services.T1219 Remote Access Software; T1036 MasqueradingMeshAgent binaries, agent.ashx, azurenetfiles.net.
DiscoveryInspect PeopleSoft, WebLogic, NFS, hosts, and process scheduler configuration.T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryReads of psappsrv.cfg, config.xml, and PeopleSoft paths from unusual processes.
Lateral movementSSH fan-out using hardcoded account/password combinations and sshpass.T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH; T1110.003 Password Sprayingsshpass, repeated SSH attempts, StrictHostKeyChecking=no.
Credential exposureOutbound SMB/TCP 445 coercion may capture NetNTLM material.T1187 Forced AuthenticationAny outbound SMB from PeopleSoft servers to internet destinations.
Collection / stagingCompress stolen data with zstd; create extortion marker files.T1560 Archive Collected Data; T1491 Defacementzstd, exfil.tar.zst, marker file creation.

Public IOCs

Network

IndicatorTypeContext
142.11.200.186
142.11.200.187
142.11.200.188
142.11.200.189
142.11.200.190
IPv4Sequential staging hosts reported by Google/Mandiant; Python SimpleHTTP on TCP/8888 exposed materials.
108.174.202.99
176.120.22.24
IPv4Additional public reporting; 176.120.22.24 reported as hosting a clearnet mirror of the ShinyHunters DLS.
azurenetfiles.netDomainMeshCentral C2 domain masquerading as Microsoft Azure NetApp Files.
wss://azurenetfiles.net:443/agent.ashxURIHardcoded MeshAgent C2 endpoint.

Files and hashes

FileSHA-256 / valueContext
.bash_history2ab684d93c1553fad87041b4dea97188a97e78589deee2a7bacff905564f3a35Attacker command history.
meshagent64-azure-ops.exef02a924c9ff92a8780ce812511341182c6b509d45bc59f3f7b522e37225d24fcPreconfigured Windows MeshCentral agent.
meshagent64-v2.exed83fdb9e53c5ff03c4cb0451ea1bebd79b53f29eadc1e2fa394c7af13a86ce2fPreconfigured Windows MeshCentral agent.
meshagent32-azure-ops.exec7e9332731b06644fc73e0046a2a89eaa59b09f54250e9bd622467187351711fPreconfigured Windows MeshCentral agent.
meshagent68257a6f9ff196179ec03624e849927f26599eb180a7c82e14ef5bc4e93bc309Unconfigured Linux MeshCentral agent.
README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOUVE-BEEN-HACKED.TXTN/ADefacement / extortion marker filename.
*_fanout.shN/AVictim-specific propagation script naming pattern.

Sentinel detection ideas

  • Alert on traffic to or from campaign IPs and azurenetfiles.net, especially from PeopleSoft servers.
  • Hunt web/WAF logs for POST /PSEMHUB/hub and POST /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector from untrusted sources.
  • Alert on outbound SMB/TCP 445 from PeopleSoft servers to public IP addresses.
  • Use Defender tables for MeshAgent hashes, Azure-masquerading filenames, meshctrl.js, and agent.ashx.
  • Hunt Linux syslog/audit for sshpass, StrictHostKeyChecking=no, zstd, exfil.tar.zst, and the extortion marker filename.
  • File integrity watch: unexpected .jsp files under PSEMHUB.war and modified XML under envmetadata/data/environment.

QRadar detection ideas

  • Create reference sets for campaign IPs, domains, PeopleSoft assets, and approved PeopleSoft admin sources.
  • Build an offense rule for external /PSEMHUB/* or /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector access against PeopleSoft assets.
  • Correlate PeopleSoft web exploitation with endpoint events: MeshAgent creation, suspicious JSP write, or outbound C2.
  • High severity: PeopleSoft server outbound SMB to internet or connection to azurenetfiles.net.
  • High severity: EDR/syslog payloads containing sshpass, *_fanout.sh, README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOUVE-BEEN-HACKED.TXT, or exfil.tar.zst.
  • Tune only after validating legitimate EMHub/PSIGW integrations and admin ranges.

Defensive actions

  • Identify all PeopleSoft PeopleTools 8.61/8.62 deployments and confirm patch/mitigation status for CVE-2026-35273.
  • Disable EMHub where possible. If not possible, restrict /PSEMHUB/* and /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector to trusted administrative networks only.
  • Block outbound SMB/TCP 445 from PeopleSoft servers to internet destinations.
  • Review WebLogic access logs from at least 27 May 2026 onward.
  • Audit PeopleSoft web-tier filesystems for unexpected JSPs, staging folders, new XML files, MeshAgent binaries, and extortion marker files.
  • Rotate PeopleSoft/WebLogic/application credentials if compromise indicators are present; preserve logs and forensic evidence before rebuild/remediation.

Source base and limitations

This report is a public-source synthesis. It intentionally avoids exploit procedure and customer-specific detail. Victim counts and scale claims should be treated cautiously where sourced from threat actor statements rather than independent confirmation.